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Book Reviews 
Art of Darkness. A Poetics of Gothic by Anne Williams. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. 323. $39.00 cloth; $14.95 paper. 
In Art of Darkness, Anne Williams sets out to discover a "poetics" of Goth-
ic, as her subtitle informs us-a set of underlying principles associated not 
only with the literature conventionally grouped under the "Gothic" rubric 
but also with its Romantic cousins, though Williams herself resists family 
metaphors precisely because of their thematic relevance here. Delineating 
such a set of "Gothic" principles is itself a tall undertaking. As Eve Sedgwick 
remarks, "Gothic" has not been the most supple of terms. Most of the best 
recent criticism of Gothic literature, including much gender-inflected com-
mentary, has bracketed the idea of defining it, nodding oniy to the difficulty 
of doing so. Different critics have used the term "Gothic" to describe an his-
torical designation or certain plot devices or imagistic conventions or the-
matics or formal structures or overlapping combinations of these. Thus 
Williams's project itself seems necessarily somewhat arbitrary and restric-
tive. To propose what Gothic itself "is" reifies the category unnecessarily. 
Why do so? 
Williams's chief reason is to break down the long-discussed division be-
tween "Gothic" and "Romantic" in British literature, which often is identi-
fied both as to genre and as to gender: "Gothic" novelists (often women, 
who appeal to a popular audience) versus "Romantic" poets (men, who 
write high art). "Gothic" principles which cut across prose and poetry reveal 
what writing in different genres has in common. Of course for a long time 
now-certainly since Ellen Moers's classic essay "Female Gothic" and Gilbert 
and Gubar's The Madwoman in the Attic-critics have resisted the idea of 
seeing Gothic fiction as an illegitimate relative of Romanticism. One part of 
Williams's discussion that I find especially lively and interesting is her de-
scription of the mutuality of the two: while "Gothic" may well have fed into 
a mainstream Romanticism (where one can yet perceive its ughosts," as 
Judith Wilt suggested), Romanticism fed back into a "Gothic" tradition. 
What I find less valuable is what Williams puts in place of the old cate-
gories: a differentiation between "Male" and "Female" Gothic. Again, such a 
division is made pOSSible oniy because of the reified (essentialized?) way 
"Gothic" itself is described. 
At the very beginning of her "Acknowledgments" section, Williams de-
scribes what she calls "the main thesis of the book": that the Gothic tradition 
"expresses the dangerous, the awe-full power of the 'female.' All Gothic 
trappings-ruins, graves, dark enclosures, madness, even the sublime-sig-
nify the presence of this 'other'" (xi). Later, in chapter six, Williams notes 
that Gothic "permits the return of the repressed-the maternal principle, the 
'female,' in all the modes in which it may be recognized: in heroines, in feel-
ings, in the landscape, in death, in l'ecriture," that the Gothic nightmare is 
"very much a 'nightmere,'" related to a crisis in Western culture (96). Right! 
And nicely put! So, "female Gothic," right? 
Wrong! For Williams, "Female Gothic" is the comic plot of the Myth of 
Psyche, where ghosts are explained away and which If generates suspense 
through the limitations imposed by the chosen point of view," usually that 
of a heroine (102). "Male Gothic" is the plot of the "Bluebeard" story, with a 
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tragic end; it enters the fantastic world where ghosts, vampires, and demons 
exist; it is voyeuristic, sadistic, even pornographic, usually with multiple 
points of view. Williams's classification, which goes beyond merely reiterat-
ing, extends and amplifies our understanding of the old distinction between 
"terror" Gothic, associated with Ann Radcliffe, and "horror" Gothic, asso-
ciated with "Monk" Lewis. Sometimes her taxonomy does not quite hold 
true. Atm Radcliffe, Mary Shelley, Charlotte and Emily Bronte all use multi-
ple points of view; the work of all of these often tends toward the sadistic 
and voyeuristic; yet (although Williams is not necessarily assigning "Male" 
Gothic to male writers and "Female" Gothic to women), I believe that she 
would call the work of all of these writers "Female Gothic." Frankenstein, one 
of the original "Female Gothic" texts described in the Ellen Moers essay that 
created the term, is a special problem. Williams discusses it briefly but does 
not really suggest its place in her system, except to say that we should read 
it as a "Romantic" text. 
One problem is that Williams's heavily theoretical discussion tends to be 
overly general, in love with the terms of the theory she uses rather than 
based on the texts. Sometimes I would like more close readings of these 
texts. Although she devotes some attention to novels (The Monk, Dracula, The 
Mysteries of Udolpho, as well as Frankenstein), the texts Williams reads most 
closely are the more canonical: Coleridge's Rime of the Ancient Mariner and 
"Frost at Midnight," Keats's "Eve of St. Agnes." While Williams is interested 
in French feminist theory (Kristeva and Irigaray, in particular), the writers 
who really engage her are those who have been long valorized; in that way, 
she ends up reinscribing the old canon. But while her discussions of these 
texts do indeed convince that they deserve election to the Gothic pantheon-
that "Gothic in literature is broader than genre, deeper than plot, and wider 
than a single tradition" (241)-the real light in these discussions is kindled 
from the spark made by the contact between theory and text. 
Among the best readings here are those of the two traditional tales 
("Bluebeard" and "Psyche") and the epilogue, "The Mysteries of Enlighten-
ment; or Dr. Freud's Gothic Novel," where the collected works of Sigmund 
Freud are read as Gothic story. But interestingly, whether Freud's Gothic 
is "Male" or "Female" is not altogether dear (the same is true of Keats's)-
testimony to the problems with the categories themselves. 
In assigning sex to the two categories, Williams follows the lead of critics 
such as Kate Ellis, who in The Contested Castle (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1989) identified "masculine" and "feminine" forms of Gothic. But 
changing Ellis's gender-terms ("masculine" and "feminine") to their biologi-
cal counterparts ("male" and "female") confuses the issue. The "gendered 
Gothic" that Ellis describes makes sense within the (historicist) framework 
she uses; but texts are neither male nor female. The term "Male Gothic" ap-
pears to have been conjured up as a literary companion to the already-
described "Female Gothic" and defined in reaction to it. "Male Gothic" is 
perhaps an inevitable language-effect. Re-identifying the terms does interest-
ingly overturn the usual hegemony of gendering literary modes. While 
French-style criticism often makes a great deal out of the idea that literary 
modes are masculine-defined, and that the task of women who write is to 
s 
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elude such definition, literary criticism here defines a "Male" mode in reac-
tion to a "Female" one. 
But Williams uses the term "Female Gothic" in a different sense from the 
usual in order to create this dialectic, and the symmetry she creates may not 
be worth trading for our other understandings of the term. Like "Gothic" it-
self, "Female Gothic" has been variously understood, changed, and ampli-
fied since Moers, but has tended to stick fairly closely to its original sense: to 
suggest a subtext of female sexuality, sometimes also to inquire into other 
formal conventions of these texts and their connection to this sub text, as well 
as to the historical conditions under which women wrote these novels. Read-
ers have often used the term as a lever to inquire into that very repressed-
but-returning, female-identified "other" of which Williams herself writes so 
eloquently. 
But to generalize from a few critics who "agree that the affinity between 
the gender and the genre expresses the terror and rage that women experi-
ence within patriarchal social arrangements, especially marriage" (136) over-
states the case of such critics, excludes too much, and makes such criticism 
sound more monolithic than it really is. The critics who argue this point of 
view tend to be historicist, with social concerns; deconstructive and French 
Feminist readings have long revealed a different picture of this relationship. 
In any case, Williams's rhetorical move is at best ungenerous: after rede-
fining the terms, she takes to task past critics who have failed "to distinguish 
the real differences between Male and Female Gothic" (136) or who have 
"missed" one or the other categories simply because they haven't defined 
the categories as she has. That's hardly fair. This talk of "real differences" 
betrays the essentializing at work here, even though she herself protests (in a 
different context), "I do not imply that anything is essentially masculine or 
feminine" (279). And while Williams does a good job reporting on past femi-
nist criticism of Gothics, she does not really engage it or suggest points of 
contact but rather uses it to clear a space for her own theories. 
Williams suggests at one point that the mother-daughter relationship 
among (Female) Gothic plots "even implies an alternative to Bloom's Oedi-
pal theory of literary influence: a model not founded on conflict but on ac-
cretion" (160-61). That thought is not original with Williams, but 1 think it is 
correct. But Art of Darkness is a text full of anxiety of influence. Williams 
might better have taken a lesson from the Gothic mothers of which she 
writes. 
If Gothic modes express anxieties of the times when they were written, as 
Williams suggests, so too does this book. Such anxieties do not make either 
less interesting. Anyone interested in Gothic and Romantic writers and the 
relationship between gender and genre should read Art of Darkness. 
Cayuga Community College Susan Wolstenholme 
The Politics of English Jacobinism: Writings of John The/wall. Edited by Gregory 
Claeys. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1995. Pp lxii + 532. $75 cloth, $22.95 paper. 
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J aim Thelwall occupies a peculiar position in British political and literary 
history. One of the most versatile and inventive writers and speakers of that 
most turbulent and momentous period, the 17905, Thelwall was at once a 
far-sighted political theorist, a stalwart defender of working-class interests, a 
provocative orator and pamphleteer, an accomplished poet and novelist, and 
an experienced journalist and editor (he also had legal and medical training, 
and beCan1€ a successful speech therapist, but that is another story). Yet, par-
adoxically, his very notoriety and eclecticism appear to have condemned 
him to obscurity, at first silenced in the conservative backlash of the early 
nineteenth century, then swept into the cracks between literary and political 
history. Some of his poetry and fiction is accessible to scholars, thanks to a 
series of reprints by Garland Press and Woodstock Books in the 1970s and 
1980s. Yet he remains an obscure figure in literary history, remembered, if at 
all, rather as a minor correspondent of Coleridge than as an innovative 
writer whose political sentiments and generic experiments influenced both 
Coleridge and Wordsworth at a formative period in their poetical careers. In 
the field of political histmy, the situation is reversed. E. P. Thompson's 
ground-breaking and popular scholarship and the revival of interest in the 
revolutionary decade have elevated Thelwall's reputation among not only 
historians but working-class activists in Britain. Yet, oddly, none but short 
excerpts of his political writings has ever been reprinted. 
With the publication of this first collection of Thelwall's political writings 
by British historian Gregory Claeys, readers interested in Thelwall as a polit-
ical thinker, a literary experimenter, a firebrand reformer or a working-class 
hero can have easy access to texts which will allow them to measure the in-
tellectual originality and verbal ingenuity of the man whom his contempo-
raries called "one of the boldest political writers, speakers and lecturers of 
his time" (xiii). Claeys reprints the most important of Thelwall's political 
writings and lectures from the period of his greatest public activity and no-
toriety, 1795-96: two pamphlets, The Natural alld Constitutional Right of Brit-
OilS to Allnual Parliaments, Universal Suffrage, alld the Freedom of Popular 
Association and Sober Reflections all the Seditious alld Illflammatory Letter of the 
Rt. Han. Edmond Burke to a Noble Lord; substantial selections from Thelwall's 
periodical The Tribune, containing his political lectures from that period; and 
his most important theoretical work The Rights of Nature. Attractive and 
clearly-organized, the volume also contains a detailed critical introduction 
to the writings which reviews Thelwall's life and times, and evaluates his in-
tellectual development and significance. Claeys includes a more complete 
bibliography of Thelwall's work than any thus published, as well as compre-
hensive notes and an index. 
Claeys' key claim, and the principle behind his selection of texts, is that 
Thelwall's real Significance as a radical thinker lies in his economic rather 
than his political ideas; or rather, in his shifting of "the discourse on political 
rights of the early 1790s ... toward an economic focus" (liv) which antici-
pates the main thrust of 19th-century radicalism. Of the four major texts re-
printed here, there is much that is representative of the "discourse of 
political rights" in the period: vigorous vindications of freedoms of speech 
and association and universal suffrage; passionate defenses of the essential 
principles of both the French Revolution and the English republican tradi-
s 
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tion; spirited and satirical attacks on aristocracy and monarchy, luxury and 
corruption, patronage and prilTlOgeniture; reasoned calls for reform of prop-
erty and redistribution of wealth. Many of the ideas found in these writings 
are shared by others, notably Thomas Paine, whose inflated reputation has 
tended to cast Thelwall into the role of a popularizer rather than an origina-
tor. VVhile Claeys acknowledges Thehvall's importance as a spokesman, 
"restating ,vith great conviction the virtues of the English republican tradi-
tion against the inhumanity of aristocratic cabals" (xxxvi), his real mission is 
to restore Thelwall's "great originality" as "one of the most perceptive and 
innovative thinkers among the reformers, probing into many areas un-
touched by his more renmvned contemporary, Thomas Paine" (xxxvi). Hence 
he reprints The Rights of Nature and selections from The Tribune which show 
the unique economic focus that Thehvall gave to the political debate. Ac-
cording to Claeys, these writings shmv Thelwall turning a\vay from the nar-
rowly moral and anti-commercial perspective that characterizes both 
nostalgic pastoralists like Godwin, and classical republicans like Burgh. In-
stead 111elwall confronts and embraces the modern commercial system, ana-
lyzing its origins and nature, its benefits and inequities, from an urban, 
political and economic perspective. "T\10re dynamic and commercially-
oriented" than Paine (xlvi), Thelwall goes beyond his better-known contem-
porary by focusing on class in relation to the means of production, and prop-
erty in relation to the rights of labour. Grafting economic ideas drawn from 
Adam Smith onto Painite ideas of political and social equality, Thelwall in 
The Rights of Nature proposes "a new vision of economic justice ... centred 
on the contractual relations between worker and employer" as equals, 
thereby heralding that "ideal of cooperative partnership between labour and 
capital" that characterizes much nineteenth-century liberal and socialist 
thought (JiiHiv). 
Claeys' resurrection and reevaluation of Thelwall as an innovative political 
and economic thinker is peculiarly timely now, in an era in which the dis-
course of political rights has been so thoroughly coopted by the discourse of 
economics. It is appropriate that as global economic forces endeavour to 
wipe out the social gains of the past 200 years, we be reminded of those who 
analyzed the conflict between market values and democratic ideals at its ori-
gin. It is refreshing, too, to hear a voice which argues, with energy, wit and 
conviction, that social principles need not be sacrificed on the altar of finan-
cial expediency, that the poor and the disenfranchised have not only the 
right but the intellectual resources to make informed decisions, and that la-
bour is the genuine basis for property: "Let the proprietor reflect upon the 
nature of his possession -let him reflect upon the genuine basis of property. 
What is it, after all, but human labour? And who is the proprietor of that la-
bour?-Who, but the individual who labours?" (The Rights of Noture, 475). 
'Alhether enquiring into the rights of labourers, investigating the causes of 
poverty, defending the right to associate, or advocating rational enquiry over 
violent agitation, Thelwall consistently combines analysis with activism, phi-
losophy with pragmatism, the intellectual with the popular. 
This philosophic populism, or principled pragmatism, is perhaps the most 
notable quality of this collection. These are theories shaped, tested and 
marked by a knowledge of the people, a grasp of practical politics and an 
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experience of government persecution that other theorists of the period lack. 
Thelwall's experience as the chief strategist of the London Corresponding 
Society, a speaker at vast outdoor lectures, a political prisoner and defendant 
in the Treason Trials of 1794, and a target of informers and church-and-king 
mobs leaves him intensely aware of the power of the state and of the vulner-
ability of individuals and the populace exposed to its repressive measures. 
Nevertheless this experience renders all the more intense his faith in the 
power of rational enquiry and his respect for the intellectual capacity of the 
common people, their willingness and desire to reason and judge for them-
selves. nlis faith is born out of and borne out by Thelwall's participation in 
the debating clubs and corresponding societies that, for a brief period in the 
1790s, became the working-class equivalents of those genteel social clubs 
which were so fundamental to the development of society and culture in the 
late eighteenth century. In The Rights of Nature Thelwall announces a radical 
recentering of this cultural capital: 
Man is, by his very nature, social and communicative. . Whatever 
presses men together, therefore, though it may generate some vices, is 
favourable to the diffusion of knowledge, and ultimately promotive of 
human liberty. Hence every large workshop and manufactory is a sort 
of political society, which no act of parliament can silence, and no 
magistrate disperse .... [A] sort of Socratic spirit will necessarily grow 
up, wherever large bodies of men assemble. Each brings, as it were, 
into the common bank his mite of information, and putting it to a sort 
of circulating usance, each contributor has the advantage of a large 
interest, without any diminution of capital (400-401). 
Effectively countering Burke's metaphor of civilized tradition as a bank of 
ages, Thelwall's notion of the factory as a credit union of ideas not only illus-
trates the economic focus that Claeys finds so characteristic of Thelwall's po-
litical writings, but fits well with his overall emphasis in The Rights of Nature 
on the circulation of knowledge, which "cannot operate, to any beneficial 
purpose, or produce any general civilization of society, till it becomes pretty 
generally diffused" (486). Linking the monopolization of knowledge to mo-
nopolies of power and property, Thelwall argues strongly that those who la-
bour for knowledge to exist have an equal right to obtain its .advantages. His 
work is a conscious attempt to wrest the space of discussion away from the 
aristocratic monopolizers, to recentre the narrow circle of knowledge and 
extend it to the 
"hundreds, nay thousands, in those classes excluded from [Burke's] 
calculations, who though they could neither endite, nor comprehend 
his learned metaphors and dashing periods, would yet blush at [his] 
flimsy sophisms who understand the principles of government 
mucb better than himself, and who want nothing but practical fluency 
to render them most formidable antagomsts to the whole college of 
aristocratical disclaimers" (399-400). 
This emphasis on the circulation and diffusion of knowledge, this promo-
tion of a cooperative information economy, is reflected in Thelwall's own 
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rhetorical strategy. He can occasionally be self-dramatizing and egotistical, 
takirlg the stance of a prophet or martyr (predictably, such gestures increase 
in the later writings, as he feels increasingly beleaguered and persecuted). 
But on the whole Thelwall takes great pains to decenter his authority, to 
present himself neither as pedagogue nor as demagogue, but as a planter 
of seeds for his listeners and readers to cultivate, a gatherer of "materials 
wherewith to work for themselves in those grand enquiries in which it is the 
happiness and interest of man to be engaged" (Tribune, 80-81). Among these 
materials are the facts, anecdotes and statistics which are some of the most 
striking features of the Tribune. In one lecture, in a more direct and down-to-
earth version of Paine's analysis of tax statistics, Thelwall tabulates weekly 
earnings and expenses of poor families to counter prejudices about the in-
dulgent and indolent nature of the laborious poor; in another, in a technique 
that anticipates and may well have influenced Cobbett, he pursues the same 
end by setting images of rural life gained from poetry and from his own ru-
ral walks side by side by side: 
I took the opportunity of seeing, as far as I could, the condition of 
those orders of society, about whose happiness in the country I had 
heard so many romantic stories, while I was an inhabitant of the town, 
and took my ideas of rural felicity from novels and pastorals. I beheld 
there poor women, doubled with age, toiling, from morning to night, 
over their wheels, spirming their flax and hemp ... I was astonished, I 
own, at this picture of misery. I had read a good deal in poems and 
romances about rural felicity. I did not kn.0w that rural felicity con-
sisted in sitting over a wheel until one is double, and getting neither 
comforts nor conveniencies-no, nor the necessaries of life, to sustain 
and prop one's declining years, by this eternal drudgery (165-66). 
Here, as elsewhere, Thelwall presents himself as the model for his listeners 
and readers: a sympathetic self-educated man straddling the artisan and 
professional classes, in whom the collision behveen sentiment and self-inter-
est, idealism and economics, prejudice and experience, has brought to an 
understanding of the need for radical reform. 
TIle same collision of the sociological and the sentimentat the theoretical 
and the commercial, the pragmatic and the poetic is evident in ThelwaJ]'s 
style, "\vhich he tells his readers in The Tribune is calculated to "steel your 
breasts and soften your hearts at the same moment" (151). Often he juxta-
poses the concrete and the abstract, as in his frequent apologies for descend-
ing from sentimental idealism, prophetic indignation or political speculation 
to "minute particulars of aritlunetic" in order to "drive the nail of conviction 
into the hard block of a heart which dv,'ells, but too frequently, in the bosom 
of the proud being "\ve call man" (262). Metaphysics and materialism often 
collide, as in this passage from The Rights of Nntllrc in which gothic po\,\lers 
of the state are set against the physiological (literally organ-ie) body of the 
people: 
"[T]o lay this 'wandering ghost of popular discontent, the simulator, 
Pitt, has drawn once more around him the magic circle of delusion, 
with charms and spells of pretended negociation, and b<lekward ml1t-
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ters of arrogance and recantation. But lift up your voices, ye artificers, 
ye mechanics, ye manufachlrers of the land! ... Wear not your lW1gs 
with sighs and sullen murmurs-let not only the nocturnal phantom, 
but the living body of your complaints appear before your oppressors . 
. . . [TJell them ... that 'your discontent can never be allayed, without 
the restoration of equal rights, and equal laws, and the adoption of a 
pure and independent organ, through which the opinions ... of the 
whole nation, can be freely delivered, and distinctly heard" (404-05). 
Such metaphorical juxtapositions make for a vivid and engaging style. In-
deed, one of the most useful aspects of this collection is that it may at last 
put to rest a misperception that has dogged Thelwall since Hazlitl first made 
it: that his written prose is drab and flat, lacking the rhetorical brilliance of 
Burke, the plainspoken clarity of Paine, or even the fire and force of his own 
speaking style. None of these selections gives any ground for such dispar-
agement. While there are plenty of exclamation marks, and over-emphatic or 
hyperbolic expressions, what strikes one after reading these writings is not 
just the vigour and rhetorical flourish of Thelwall's prose, but its variety and 
flexibility. Thelwall's style ranges from the elevated language of constitu-
tions to direct addresses to the common man, from allegory to street songs, 
from abstract principles to concrete, dramatic particulars. Especially notable 
is the mingling and shifting of tones and voices, which also characterizes 
Thelwall's literary work. In The Rights of Nature, for example, Thelwall dram-
atizes the conflict between natural and contractual rights in the voices of 2 
speakers: a passionately eloquent but eminently rational Mother Nahlre and 
an Employer whose dismissive and peremptory vernacular makes him 
sound like one of Fielding's apoplectic Squires. 
A versatile satirist and brilliant mimic, Thelwall is at his best when going 
head to head with Burke, which he does in The Rights of Nature by quoting 
him copiously, then engaging with his words as in debate. At one moment 
he adopts Burke's own terminology and tone, rising to the same passionate 
metaphorical pitch in order to argue the opposite point. At the next moment 
he playfully reverses, literalizes, deconstructs and/ or improvises upon 
Burke's metaphors. Sometimes he uses logic to analyze and undermine his 
opponent's terms and premises; at others he discredits his principles by 
identifying them with the very groups and ideas that Burke reviled. In its 
extravagant and dynamic dialogism, it is a virtuoso performance of the op-
positional techniques that characterize radical satire, according to Jon 
Klancher and Marcus Wood. But Burke is by no means 111elwall's only tar-
get; his appropriation of and play upon his opponents' language is often 
more generat as in this passage from The Tribune in which he analyses the 
causes of scarcity of salt-water fish, taking aim at those who see jacobinical 
discontent as cause of all complaint by asking 
Will any man make me believe that the fishes are infected also with 
the rage of emigration? - Will you tell me that they also have drank 
the poisonous doctrines of jacobinism, and become discontented with 
the glorious constitution, under which for so many centuries they have 
so happily been eaten; and that, therefore, the herrings have fled from 
E 
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the coasts of Scotland, and the salmon deserted our rivers, and, to-
gether with the other factious inhabitants of our streams and shores, 
have fled, with atheistical abhorrence of all regular government, to the 
coasts and rivers of French anarchy, or the distant and happy shores of 
America, that they might enjoy the pleasure of being eaten without al-
loy from the consideration that they were put in the mouths of what 
they rebelliously consider as bondmen and slaves? (69). 
This passage offers good evidence, too, of one of the most appealing charac-
teristics of Thelwall's writing: his sense of humour, a quality missing from 
so many of the other participants in the revolution debate. Even at his most 
scathingly satiric, Thelwall retains a genial good telnper, and even pokes fun 
at himself on occasion. 
Thelwall's wit and dramatic flair, his rhetorical versatility, his shifts and 
sallies of trope and tone, account for his phenomenal popularity as an orator 
and make these selections a pleasure to read, inclining one to feel that a de-
tailed study of Thelwall's prose style is long overdue. But more than this, 
these qualities invite the literary critic to reflect on a broader subject which 
critics like Olivia Smith and Don Bialostosky have only begun to develop: 
the influence of public discussion, political oratory and popular speech gen-
res upon the romantic literary imagination. In the light of Thelwall's friend-
ship with Coleridge and Wordsworth, for example, it is not impossible-
indeed, it is likely-that much of the poetry, as well as the theory, of Lyrical 
Ballads bears traces of Thelwall's influence. Certainly these selections contain 
many figures that will be familiar to readers of romantic poetry, including an 
old woman stealing sticks from hedges who appears to be the original of 
Wordsworth's Goody Blake. As both an orator and a disciple of Horne 
Tooke, Thelwall may well have taught Wordsworth much about the "real 
language of men." 
Not only Thelwa]]'s rhetoric, but his political and economic ideas may be 
of interest to the literary scholar. Throughout The Rights of Natllre, Thelwall 
consistently links his economic argument to issues of intellechtal and discur-
sive labour, property, inheritance and distribution. His ideas have radical 
implications for our view of literary relations and textual value, suggesting, 
among other things, that the value of any cultural product lies more in its 
circulation, its status as a medium of exchange or a space for debate, than in 
its aesthetic quality or metaphysical truth-claims. 
It is ironic that someone as committed to intellectual exchange and accessi-
bility as Thehvall was should have been taken out of circulation by the vicis-
situdes of history. Claeys' fine edition should help put Thelwall back in the 
mainstream of political history. If his literary works were given equal atten-
tion, this inh·iguing and challenging thinker and stylist of the 1790s might 
yet have much to contribute to debates about politics, economics, literahlre 
and their relationship in the 1990s. 
Dalhol/sie University Judith 111Ompson 
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A Defense af Paetry: Reflections 0/1 the Occasion of Writing by Paul H. Fry. Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995. Pp. 255. $45.00, cloth; $16.95, 
paper. 
As Paul Fry's title shows, a point of departure for his intricate and wel-
come reflections on "writing" is Shelley's famous essay, A Defence af Poetry. 
Fry rightly praises this essay as "the strongest defense of poetry ever writ-
ten," seeing it as pioneering a genre, the '''critique of Enlightenment''' (3), to 
which his own volume seeks to belong. But he finds fault with Shelley's es-
sayan two counts: it conceives of poetry "not as a suspension of truth-claims 
but as a renewal of them" (3) and its broad definition of poetry raises the 
question "poetry as opposed to what?" (4). Fry sees the purpose of his book 
as an attempt to find answers to these perceived weaknesses in Shelley's es-
say; he asserts: "I claim that poetry (literature, expressive communication), 
unlike other forms of discourse that exhaust themselves shaping or making 
sense of things, is that characteristic of utterance, defined as "ostension" in 
the ensuing chapters, which telnporarily releases consciousness from its de-
pendence on the signifying process" (4). F>y wants poetry to be negatively 
capable with regard to "truth," to suspend our irritable reaching after cer-
tainty. Indeed, one of his most intriguing chapters is his "Conclusion/' en-
titled "The Ethics of Suspending Knowledge," in which he argues that "the 
suspension of knowledge enabled by ostension can serve to reinvigorate the 
very quest it interrupts" (201) and relates his position to, or rather insinuates 
its affinity with, Blanchot's hostility to "knowledge" in "Literature an the 
Right to Death" (though, for Fry, Blanchot "aestheticizes the moment more 
than I wish to do" [209]). Lyotard's attempt to "think the nonhuman" (206) is 
also enlisted by Fry in his praise of ostension. But Fry does more here than 
drop names with gusto; he makes one realize the significance of a number of 
seemingly anti-humanist remarks made by the thinkers whose work he de-
scribes. More than this, he establishes, with a quietly unintimidated poise, a 
sense of his own nuanced reservations about the ideas of these thinkers; he 
remains, throughout, independent and stimulating, nowhere more so than in 
the final paragraph where he suggests w>yly that the enterprise which he 
recommends is unachievable: "But can we, after all, think the nonhuman, 
which is as much as to say, the real? Probably not" (211). 
A Defense af Poetry consists of three parts and nine chapters, with an intro-
duction and a conclusion as bookends. Its key term, ostension, presides over 
the first part, made of four chapters which seek to define "the ostensive 
moment" (5) as bound up with "Non-construction" (chapter 1), "Insig-
nificance" (chapter 2), "estrangement from instrumental language" (50; chap-
ter 3), and the envious discovery by poems of "the meaninglessness of the 
nonhuman in pictures" (70; chapter 4). Ostension allows Fry to defend with 
resourceful ingenuity positions which bear a family resemblance to some tra-
ditional notions. Though the author is at pains to describe, say, his belief in 
the "invariability of recurrent experience" as "pan-historical" rather than 
"transhistorical" (36), it is striking how often he makes us revalue would-be 
demystifications as themselves deeply mystified. In his attempt to answer 
the question "Why do we have literature at all?" (42), Fry suggests tl1at one 
usual answer, to satisfy our need for fictions, plays into the hands of a dis-
s 
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course, that of llhistory," which is at odds with lithe function of literature." 
For Fry, we need literature, not because we want something truer than fic-
tion (after all, "the ostensive moment of literature may possibly focus a false 
intuition"), but because we want from it the complex freedom that derives 
from a "literary letting-be" (43) of existence. 
The book's second part contains, under the healing "Non-epiphany," bril-
liant readings of Wordsworth (chapter 5) and Keats (chapter 6, a revamped 
version of Fry's important essay on "To Autumn" first published in the 
"Keats and Politics" Forum which appeared in Studies in Romanticism, 25:2, 
1986), and a more baffling meditation on the sublime (chapter 7) which 
argues that "the identifying trait of literature is ... not the sublime" (133). In 
this last instance, Fry's negative critical way leads into a convoluted laby-
rinth. The sublime's appearance of deferring "significance" (against which 
Fry tilts throughout) is deceptive; it is, in fact, "the form of the formless and 
progenitor of all form" (134). Here, one might glimpse the limits of Fry's re-
freshing wish to abstain from the hunt for "Significance." Privileging osten-
sion, he at times adopts an implicitly (and not useful) moralizing tone with 
regard to subjectivity, the imagination's ambitions, and the supposedly inter-
fering lyric ego that reminds this reader of the less productive aspects of Ob-
jectivist poetics. The trust in "existence" (always opposed to the "human") 
leads Fry to a definition of "literature" whose purity risks a damaging exclu-
siveness. 
That said, the reading of Wordsworth in chapter 5 is genuinely illuminat-
ing about the way the poet's imagination does not illuminate. Rather, for 
Fry, Wordsworth's great moments are those "in which he is allowed to see 
nothing at all" (95), in which he discovers, or has impressed upon him, 
"opacity" (97), resistance to the imagination's fantasy of dominion, "The 
rock" as "the grey particular of man's life," in Stevens's words (quoted on 
107). The chapter on Keats contains an intriguing paragraph on the influence 
of Heidegger, a thinker whose emphaSiS on "being" is highly relevant to 
Fry's project. Fry describes and separates himself from two paths out of Hei-
degger: the "theological" (109) and the "glOOmily 'existential''' (110). His 
own position is further refined when he distinguishes his "extreme form of 
anti-intellectualism" from "historicism and formalism" (111). These last two 
isms seem opposed but they are lUlited, so Fry argues, in their application to 
Keats Gerome McGann and Helen Vendler are the respective exemplars), by 
their lack of lIa sense of otherness in the substance of existence that has little 
to do with social consciousness or with the compensations of artistic form" 
(122). It is just such "a sense of otherness" or "intimacy with existence" (the 
phrase is Stanley Cavell's, quoted on 132) which is given by "To Autumn"; 
the poem is read with Fry's characteristic sureness of touch and allusive 
riclmess of critical engagement, though it would have been of great interest 
to have watched him producing a full-scale account of one of Keats's more 
frankly subjective poems, such as "Ode to a Nightingale." "To Autumn" 
serves his argument a little too well, even though the poem's admirers 
should be lastingly grateful to Fry for putting to flight the "fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness" (129-30) evident in McGann's politicizing reading. 
The final two chapters of the book make up its third part, entitled "Return 
of the Same." The first chapter (the eightl1) addresses the "connection be-
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tween burial and poetry" (159) in Wordsworth and Byron, and argues that 
"For both poets, the poem itself ... denies its secondariness to the signified 
.. and thereby proposes itself as the sole place where life is present" (178). 
By means of this argumentative legerdemain, Fry is able to link together 
self-consciousness (which discovers that the true reality is "somatic self-
identity," 177) and ostension, as well as tvvo writers who seem poles apart in 
style and theme. The much-trodden ground of the epitaph is made to yield 
up insights compatible with Fry's by now recurrent emphases: "The epi-
taph," he writes, "is the grave site of the sublime but the privileged site of 
the' common'" (180). For all the chapter's insight (it is especially helpful on 
The Excursion), it ultimately makes very different poems fit the argument, 
rather than the argument fit the poems. The last chapter returns to the theme 
of death, and particularly to the '''romantic moment' of dying" (182) in a 
dazzling range of works, in order to counter the claim that the Romantics 
represent death morbidly. Instead, Fry sees in the different approaches 
which he documents "an anti-rhetoric" which may be "sentinlentalized" but 
which is "rarely if ever morbid" (185). Inevitably, "A Slumber Did My Spirit 
Seal" makes its obligatory appearance, this time proving that "the spirit is 
never unsealed" (199), thus reinforcing the argument of chapter 5. As inter-
esting are the comments on Shelley (especially the lady's death by dash and 
exclamation in "The Sensitive Plant), Browning, and Edward Thomas-all at 
the service of a complex argument which, drawing on Bataille's notion of 
Eros and Thanatos as "transgression" (quoted on 200), contends that death 
transgresses "the decorum of otherness." TI1erefore, Romantic writers treat 
death with a brevity which minimizes complicity in transgression yet marks 
an absence that threatens the absence on which "\vriting is predicated" (200). 
Like most pages in this important book, the one from which I have just 
quoted requires patient and repeated readings; yet readers of A Defense of 
Poetry will find that the book rewards richly the attention which it demands. 
University of Durham, UK MichaelO'Neill 
Jane Austen and Discourses of Feminism edited by Devoney Looser. New York: 
SI. Martin's Press, 1995, Pp. x + 197. $39.95. 
Jane Austen and Discourses of Feminism, edited by Devoney Looser, is a 
collection of original essays designed to take the measure of current feminist 
thinking about Austen and to establish, as it were, a kind of feminist context 
for that thinking. In "Privacy, Privilege, and 'Poaching' in Mansfield Park," 
the penultimate essay, Ellen Gardiner observes that "One of the reasons that 
Jane Austen has remained part of the twentieth-century canon is. . [that], 
as omniscient narrator in various novels, she continues to convince scholars 
that she is not merely a writer but also a critic" (151). Indeed, a central ele-
ment in each of the articles in this volume, as well as in the book as a whole, 
is to find the reason for Austen's perseverance in the canon in the face of a 
conceivable recalcitrance to twentieth-century concerns on the part of a late 
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century opus, to say nothing of the 
c 
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mission among those very scholars to justify as unique and necessary their 
own contributions to the profusion of Austen commentary. They and it must 
ans"\ver the question, lNhat more remains to be said? And yet the fact re-
mains that there are large and significant divergences and diversities of 
opinion about the author; despite all the ink that has been spilled, in large 
measure there is still a knotty stubbornness in her works that seems ulti-
mately, and like the works themselves, courteously and quietly, to resist al1 
attempts to penetrate and lay bare forever what she was about. On the one 
hand, the feminist context seems as if it would be exactly hospitable to 
studies of Austen; on the other hand, there is something inescapable and in-
definable, which leads to conflict and controversy among the critics. 
For instance, in "Consolidated Communities: Masculine and Feminine Val-
ues in Jane Austen's Fiction/' Glenda Hudson takes an unexpectedly reso-
lute exception to the claims made by Claudia Jolmson and others about the 
ending of Mansfield Parle Johnson is one of the two presiding, albeit absent, 
formative geniuses of the critical approaches in this collection; the other is 
Alison Sulloway, whose presence is lllDre directly invoked by the book's 
dedication. Their influence, nonetheless, indicates the continued develop-
ment of feminist critiques of Austen. Tt does seem a shame, though, that 
Johnson and Sulloway are not represented in this assembly since so much of 
the argument seems to steIn from territory they initially staked. In any case, 
Hudson argues against Johnson's claim that the ending is not happy despite 
the fact that the form-a marriage-is appropriate to the typos-a comedy 
("But Austen's works reveal nothing of the sort" [108]). Hudson offers a 
compelling and interesting argument built on a carefully crafted edifice of 
congenial rather than the presumably more likely disquieting nature of in-
cest, but in some ways the larger and more vexing question is, H01V can it be 
that supposedly attentive and scrupulous readers c;:nmot even agree on 
whether or not the ending of a book is positive and restful? What hope is 
there for common ground and a level playing field if even the tone of the 
close of a book is in question? The feminist context, at the least, then, seems 
to be fraying here. 
v\That Devoney Looser has undertaken, as she indicates in the introduction 
to this volume, is to display examples from "the thriving industry of Jane 
Austen criticism," where "the driving force is arguably feminist" (1). The two 
men and eight women whose essays she includes address varying aspects of 
"the workings of gender politics in her novels" (9). But that may well be the 
only common denominator as the critics range independently across issues 
of sociopolitics as an endowment of Anglican Enlightenment (Gary Kelly's 
"Jane Austen, Romantic Feminism, and Civil Society"); feminist rewriting of 
historiography in the juverulia (Antoinette Burton's "/Invention Is vVhat De-
lights Me': Jane Austen's Remaking of 'English' History"); Austen as devel-
oper of Literahlre with a capital L (Clifford Siskin's "Jane Austen and the 
Engendering of DiscipJinarity"); aspects of the Gothic, probably the least in-
novative of the topics of this book (Diane Hoeveler's "Vindicating Northal1ger 
Abbey: Mary vVollstonecraft, Jane Austen, and Gothic Feminism" and Maria 
Jerinic's "In Defense of the Gothic: Rereading Nortlwl1gcr Abbey"); and, per-
haps inevitably, homoeroticism in the 'ivork of an unmarried 'ivoman (in 
Misty Anderson's "'The Different Sorts of Friendship': Desire in Mmlsfielri 
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Park"). What is apparent is that the dialogues or discourses in which these 
authors participate are not with one another since their subjects are, for the 
most part, so disparate. Even in the two essays on Northanger Abbey and the 
three in effect dedicated to Mansfield Park, including Hudson's which is lo-
cated separately from the two in the identified MP section, the terms and 
contents of the arguments differ radically, finally. It is not so much that the 
critics talk at cross purposes as that they engage diverging agendas and op-
erate on differently tilted planes. This certainly makes this assembly rich and 
provocative, and readers who consult most of these essays will be rewarded 
for their efforts, but it also simultaneously opens a gap at the center. Whom 
is the discourse of these learned experts with, then? Or, better, whom is the 
feminist discourse about Jane Austen with? 
Before I continue, I urge readers particularly to savor the insights of Laura 
Mooneyham White's "Jane Austen and the Marriage Plot: Questions of Per-
sistence," which, with Hudson's piece, is one of the two finest essays here. 
White endeavors to understand the marriage plot through three of the nov-
els and the final fragment Sanditon in terms that concede contemporary reali-
ties and position the premise in relation to this context rather than in 
defiance of it. For instance, the critic writes, "Austen's earlier work all em-
phasize that through marriage one becomes part of a social and economic en-
tity. Marriage allows the heroine to join the wholeness of society even as she 
joins the unity of male and female. But the social and psychological integra-
tion marriage has represented may never have been a narrative goal in this 
last Austen narrative. In the flux of Sanditon, marriage'S utility as a symbol 
of this all-encompassing integration is seriously marred. There is no stable 
society left ... Here Austen bravely faces a new world in which the endings 
are open, in which marriage and its attendant securities are no longer guar-
anteed. Sanditon may represent the undoing of Austen's earlier sexual deter-
minlsm. As a text in which the erotic seems to be unmoored from its earlier 
position as sexual anchor, Sanditon allows the reader of Austen to experience 
that surprise, emptiness, and excitement appropriate to a new form of fic-
tional understanding" (83). Forgive me for the long quote, but I seek to con-
vey the richness and full flavor of White's critique, the ways that it embraces 
structural, psychological, and historical approaches in an enlightening analy-
sis of the form and genre of the text. 
Repeatedly as I have read and thought about this book I have wanted to 
insert the article "the" between the third and fourth words of the title: Jane 
Austen and [the] Discourses of Feminism. That that little word is truant is, I 
think, important to the project of this collection. Its absence speaks to the 
"gap" I mentioned above. Were the article supplied, there would be an im-
plicit definition of the topic, a restriction of the breadth of the contents of this 
volume and likely thereby a parallel fOCUSing of the contents of the book 
upon a particular understanding or delineation or demarcation of the sub-
ject. In that case, with the discourse defined, the assembled writers would 
address the same issues or different issues from similar perspectives. In-
stead, without the article, the subject becomes or is revealed to be diffuse, 
unlimited, perhaps inexhaustible. And that is the promise, the paradox, and 
the problem herein, jt seems to me. 
Of course, to some extent the dialogue is with the reader if the reader is 
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uninformed or disinclined to agree or to be persuaded. However, assuming 
that we are all willing to entertain the unfolding arguments at least through 
the course of their deployment, it seems to me that, openly or not, there is 
another actor in the dialogue, and that is Jane Austen herself. And, at the 
least, she is not cooperating, not complicit. I'll use two of the essays to 
illustrate. 
Siskin declares that Austen's failure even to attempt to contribute, much 
less to participate, in the prodigious periodical publication of fiction in her 
era argues for a conscious decision on her part to opt for Literature: "VV-hat 
this comparative judgment [her much quoted defense of the novel in Nor-
thanger Abbey] and her publication decisions-whatever the other factors that 
influenced them -point to is Austen's apparent participation in the historical 
transformation of the two-tier market into a hierarchical system of what we 
now know as high versus low culture-a hierarchization that in narrowing 
the range of proper writing ushered in the disCiplinary advent of the new 
category of Literature" (56). Several implications emerge here. First, the com-
ment, "whatever the other factors that influenced them/' seems a qualifica-
tion that might potentially derail the entire argument but that is barely 
acknowledged. However, probably of more moment in terms of the thesis is 
the imputation that Austen is reborn as a critic in the same fashion that the 
opening quote by Gardiner accomplishes. Moreover, she is even become, fol-
lowing this same line of reasoning, virtually a prototypical Modernist before 
her time~opting for the elite standards of a restricted readership-if not as a 
partisan in the self-conscious studies overseen by English Deparhnents 
which the term "discipline" in the argument suggests. Moreover, but also, 
perhaps more to the point, the commentary endeavors to tell us her motiva-
tion. That is to say, we have an example, it appears, of the intentional fal-
lacy. This is what Austen meant to do or to say. We understand what she 
does because we declare why she did it. The context supplies meaning and 
motivation at once. 
Similarly, Anderson's essay interprets in a new way the uneasiness that 
Fanny Price in Mansfield Price feels in the presence of Mary Crawford, which 
generations of readers surely assumed derived from Fanny's knowledge that 
not only did both of them love the same man, Edmund, but that also, most 
probably, Mary was his beloved rather than Fanny. For those same genera-
tions Fanny's discomfort and unhappiness were satisfactorily accounted for 
as both envy and jealousy, I presume. However, under the new dispensation 
they are identified as sexual attraction. In fact, they turn out to constitute the 
love that cannot be named, in fact, the love that Austen could not name. 
Anderson writes, "These unwritten plots include the suppressed or inter-
rupted narratives of Mansfield Park that were incompatible with its plot and 
with social convention. Austen breaks her silence to attempt to tell the story 
of the 'I' [the interpolated narrative voice], which is the 'desire for another 
logic of plot' that cannot fit in the story or its ideology. Perhaps it is the story 
of a woman's desires and their multifaceted forms that were edited post-
humously by her sister Cassandra down to what Janet Todd called the 
'harmless residue' of Jane Austen's life" (182). Thus, we are informed that 
both Jane and Cassandra deliberately chose to conceal a lesbian story, and 
that that indeed was the truth all along. In other words, to be blunt, a text 
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can be willfully misread via a twentieth-century feminist construct and then 
attributed to the author herself and to her nineteenth-century family. If this 
is so, then truly the possibilities of criticism are inexhaustible, if not infinite. 
There are truly no limits when we discount contemporaneous culture. 
Discourses of feminism, in short, then, are with Austen herself. If they are 
correct, they attempt to tell her what she must surely already know, that is, 
the meanings and motives behind her art. If they are wrong, then of what 
value are they? However, the point is that they function on the level of in-
tention and purpose rather than result and product, style and art. Hence, it 
is ultimately not any surprise if there is some residual resistance on the part 
of the text to even the most determined of critics to wrench a particular 
meaning out of it. Too bad we don't just let the books speak to us. Too bad 
we are often so busy speaking that we cannot always hear what they have to 
say. 
Kennesaw State University Laura Dabundo 
Majestic Indolence: English Romantic Poetry and the Work of Art by Willard 
Spiegelman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xii + 221. $45.00. 
In his study of poetry as both otium and negotium (play and work), Willard 
Spiegelman defends aesthetics against a Marxist new historicism that at-
tempts "to appropriate literature to sociology and politics at the end of the 
twentieth century, and to ignore the pleasure principle at work behind acts 
of reading" (5). While Spiegelman is interested primarily in acts of composi-
tion, in the pleasurable and anxious labor of creating poetry, the joy of close 
reading too is everywhere evident in his book, which traces the related topoi 
of work and play through Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Whitman, 
and Frost. 
Spiegelman takes "the general theme of indolence" (157) and inflects it in 
both positive and negative directions, toward the one pole represented by a 
Wordsworthian "wise passiveness" but also toward the opposite pole of a 
Coleridgean paralysis of the will. Indolence may be sloth, torpor, or Whit-
IDanian "loafing," but it may also be a period of preparation, a time-out from 
the aesthetic wars of eternity. Indolence, for Spiegelman, is thus an active 
resting-place: ideally it follows creative activity, yet also prepares the poet 
for sallying forth again. It is, for the time being, a place of play that is also a 
place of work. Idleness, however, often produces guilt-a fear of unmanli-
ness, melancholy, and even sinfulness-but equally it carries a positive so-
cial valence for those who can afford to be idle. During the Romantic period, 
Spiegelman argues, indolence "became paradoxically a symptom of the dis-
ease of modern life at the same time that leisure, recreation, and rural retreat 
were viewed as having curative powers to assuage the emotional, psycholog-
ical, and physical strains of that life" (15). 
In his first chapter Spiegelman traces the changing attitudes toward indol-
ence, from "monastic vice" (7) to eighteenth-century fashionable experience, 
in order to read the poetry of the major Romantics against this social back-
c 
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drop. But Spiegelman's main focus is on indolence as a rhetorical topos in 
specific poems that he groups under the genre of pastoral. He takes as his 
starting place Wordsworth, whose Ifgreatest original work is his defense of 
play: business and leisure turn out to be pretty much the same thing" (23). 
This idea cuts both ways: not only does it validate "that majestic indolence 
so dear / To native man" (Prelude 8.255-56) as being necessary and desir-
able, but it also glorifies the writing of poetry as in itself a kind of 
"honorable toil" (Prelude 1.626). The topos of "honorable toi!," which Cole-
ridge also invokes in "Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement/' 
need not be opposed to the labor of an active life; when it comes to art, work 
and play "turn out to be pretty much the same thing," and thus the poetic 
text becomes the site where the opposing terms in such binaries as contem-
plative/active, leisure/laboy, ohum/negotiunl, and so on, are unsettled and 
revealed to be repetition with a difference. In Wordsworth, lithe toil of 
verse" (Prelude 4.111) means hard work: "writing is labor" (52). 
And yet more than any other Romantic poet, Wordsworth expresses a 
double anxiety over writing poetry and over not writing it. When he mani-
fests the former, it is tied up with guilt over the idleness of being a poet; yet 
equally "like a guilty thing," Wordsworth compares himself to a truant, a 
false steward, a recreant, when he does not write poetry, when poetic num-
bers fail to come spontaneously, when his harp is defrauded and the singer 
ends in silence. With Coleridge, Spiegelman argues, this anxious struggle 
takes the form of a continuous self-reproach expressed in language that 
seeks to thematize its paralyzing torpor: "Coleridge'S poetry surrounds, even 
derives from, an abyss, a psychic depression that he defines through certain 
rhetorical habits" (60)-chief of which is the figure of chiasmus, the A-B-B-A 
crossover that centers on an absent point of reference, something undefined, 
like Coleridge's "grief without a pang." Spiegelman claims that "Coleridge is 
the master of chiasmus" (64), which he uses as a figure of "enfolding, mim-
icking, or mirroring" (67): "Chiasmus as the rhetorical gesture of enclosure 
everywhere counters the urmameable, indefinable dread at the heart of Cole-
ridge's poetry" (67). In a fine reading of the conversation poems, and in par-
ticular of "Dejection," which stands as a test case, Spiegelman concentrates 
on the recurrent topoi of Coleridge's feminizing passivity, self-canceling un-
responsiveness, and rhetorical negation. 
Spiegelman contends that "Indolence occupies the central place in Keats's 
aesthetics as well as in his poetic achievement" (85). Keats invested deeply 
in his evolving response to earlier representations of indolence, especially 
those by Milton and Thomson, and while he does not share Coleridge's pa-
ralysis, he does exhibit a conventional ambivalence toward idleness that can 
be "both delicious (sensuous, receptive) and diligent (strenuous, active)" 
(95). 1n this he is closer to Wordsworth, though here Spiegelman turns his 
discussion of Keats and indolence toward a rhetoric of the body in which in-
dolence is crucial to "mental as well as poetic health" (102). Recent criticism 
has attuned us to Keats's metaphorical body in its various constructions, and 
we familiarly see the Keats who sought the "wakeful anguish of the soul" as 
struggling against the "drowsy numbness" or "veil'd Melancholy" that lies 
enshrined within "the very temple of Delight." Compare this attitude to 
Shelley'S, for whom indolence "appears as a tapas within his pastoral poetry 
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. where it signifies an end to struggle, labor, and history" (111). Often that 
topos is imaged as a paradise, a cave or bower that is innocent and erotic at 
the same time. Spiegelman traces Shelley'S pastoral imagery through a num-
ber of poems, considering the poet's recurrent invitation to escape the world 
"as the outgrowth of the spoiled child's accumulative urges or, equally, as 
the nobleman's sense of inherited privilege" (122). Spiegelman sees Shelley'S 
"aristocratic hauteur" (109) as part of his rendering of pastoral as recovery, 
though Spiegelman throws Shelley into stark contrast with the earlier chap-
ters: "Of all the Romantic renditions of pastoral, Shelley'S is the least tainted 
by a georgic impulse, in spite of his radical political leanings" (129). 
"Adonais," for example, despite its "multiple homages" (132) to earlier prac-
titioners of pastoral elegy, is less a joint laboring than an experiment in per-
formance. Spiegelman'S reading emphaSizes a self-theatrical Shelley, for 
whom pastoral is spectacle, artifice, self-conscious drama. 
Spiegelman's final chapter is divided between Whitman and Frost, with 
additional short readings of poems by Elizabeth Bishop and James Merrill. 
Rather than pursue the topos of indolence through later nineteenth-century 
English poetry (e.g., Tennyson's "Lotos-Eaters"), Spiegelman crosses over to 
Whitman and Frost to find "the truest confirmation of the legacy of the 
English Romantics" (142). Whitman, however, rarely expresses the guilt or 
ambivalence toward indolence seen in Wordsworth, for example, nor does 
he engage in a poetry of encounter: "writing was the substitute for physical 
adventure, whether touristic or erotic" (149). By contrast, Frost inhabits a 
pastoral-georgic world in which play and work coincide, where idleness 
"comes as a reward or gift after work, but it also prepares the way, as gesta-
tion, for work to come" (157). Spiegelman makes a case for the varying influ-
ences of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats as contributing to the 
development of the indolence tapos in its American variations. 
As he ranges over several authors, encouraging the reader to rethink the 
relation between aesthetic work and play, Spiegelman grounds his discus-
sion in close readings of a variety of texts~often less-discussed poems, as in 
the case of Wordsworth's" A Poet's Epitaph" or even "The Brothers" -and 
he is sensitive to subtle stylistic matters as well as to the larger reach of his 
argument. That reach includes an ongoing dispute with the reductiveness (of 
new historicists who cannot deal with aesthetics in good faith. Though Spie-
gelman does not explicitly thematize criticism as part of the otium / negotium 
continuum, it is implicit in his detailed readings that the art or sullen craft of 
interpretation can likewise be figured as both work and play, a wantoning in 
wild poesy that sustains us as we write, and serve, and teach. 
University of Western Ontario J. Douglas Kneale 
Intimate Violence: Reading Rape and Torture in Twentieth-Century Fiction by 
Laura E. Tanner. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Pp. 208. 
$25.00. 
After I had agreed to review this book, it sat unopened on my desk for 
several months while I tried to work up the courage to read it. People who 
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came into my office would see it lying there, its glossy black cover broken by 
a gaping, wound-like patch of red displaying the title in ragged black letters, 
and invariably they would ask me, "Why are you reading that?" In all those 
months, nobody ever said to me, "Hey, that sounds like a really great read" 
or "I, too, am deeply interested in the subject of torture; could you lend me 
the book when you're done?" Instead, one person after another reacted to 
the mere presence of such a book exactly as I did: with revulsion and avoid-
ance. 
In fact, Intimate Violence: Reading Rape and Torture in Twentieth-Century 
Fiction takes as its central subject precisely the kind of readerly resistance 
that the book itself evokes. Without ever being so facile as to assume (as, for 
instance, many commentators on W. B. Yeats's poem IfLeda and the Swan" 
have done) that representations of violence can be reduced to mere meta-
phors for reading and writing, Laura Tanner explores the ways in which fic-
tional accounts of rape and torture enact their own kind of "intimate 
violence" upon us, their unwilling, brutalized readers. The strategies of re-
sistance that Tanner offers us are cliverse and challenging if often extremely 
subtle. Ultimately, Tanner suggests, our only weapon against violence of the 
body is the power of the mind, and engagement with the scourge of physical 
violence begins with the empowering act of critical reading: "Seeing into vio-
lence ... becomes a form of resistance when what is exposed before the eyes 
of the reader/viewer is not his or her own helplessness but the dynamics of 
violation; the critical reader in the scene of violence uncovers not just the 
vulnerability of the victim or the observer but the very power dynamics 
upon which the violator's force depends. The power of the reader to resist 
.. . the 'force' of the text often parallels, in the representation of intimate vio-
lence, the power of the reader to resist compliCity-either through passive 
viewing or unconscious participation in the act of violence represented there-
in" (15-16). 
In the course of demonstrating such strategies of readerly resistance, Tan-
ner takes us on an intimate tour of a wide range of twentieth century texts 
that depict acts of physical violence: the rape scenes in William Faulkner's 
Sanctuary and Gloria Naylor's The Women of Brewster Place; the contrasting 
depictions of torture in George Orwell's 1984 and two recent Amnesty Inter-
national television commercials; the interplay of symbolic and literal vio-
lence in D. M. Thomas's The White Hotel; the commodification of sexuality 
and violence in Hubert Selby'S Last Exit to B1'00klyn; the psychotic brutality of 
Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho; and the imbrications of race and gender 
in the rape and murder scenes depicted in Louise Erdrich's Tracks. Tanner 
focuses in minute detail on the most graphic and disturbing portrayals of vi-
olence in each of these works, deftly marshalling reader-response, semiotic, 
and materialist theoretical models in a series of intricate readings that suc-
ceed above all due to her considerable skills at close textual analysis. "The 
process of finding one's self in a scene of fictional violence," Tanner argues, 
"is the first step toward choosing a location rather than being located" (16). 
Tanner's own choice of critical location is a courageous one, and her readers 
cannot help but benefit from the clear-sightedness and sensitivity with which 
she approaches such a fraught and difficult subject. 
Like any critical study, of course, Tanner's book contains its share of limi-
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tations and omissions. In a work that draws so heavily upon Marxist and 
materialist social critique, for instance, one misses any sense of historical and 
cultural specificity; Tanner's emphasis on readers precludes her asking perti-
nent questions about the aesthetic agendas, social backgrounds, historical sit-
uations, and national identities of the writers she discusses, so that not only 
rape and torture themselves but also the writers' strategies of representation 
come to seem like timeless acts rather than the SOcially contingent entities 
that they are. Moreover, although the cover blurb promises to arm us with a 
theory of reading "that emphaSizes the reader's status as negotiator between 
the conventions of representation and the material dynamics of violence," 
the book's own negotiation between representation and reality takes place, 
necessarily, within the realm of the purely semiotic, so that it remains un-
clear how any mode of readerly resistance, however compelling, could affect 
or change the material world in which women and men really are raped and 
tortured daily. "My study of reading," Tanner notes, "represents a move to-
ward empowering myself and other readers with the ability to resist the pull 
of violation, if only in representational terms" (ix). That "if only" is crucial; 
intellectual analysis of representations of violence is not the same thing-
however much one might wish it could be-as countering violence itself. 
Paradoxically, in fact, Intimate Violence, even while empowering the reader 
of violent fiction, increases one's sense of impotence in the face of real-life 
violence, for it points to and even deepens the very gap between substance 
and symbol that it aims, in Tanner's words, to "negotiate." How, then, is the 
enlightened, empowered reader supposed to respond to the violence enacted 
not only in but also by this book? What strategies of readerly resistance can 
and should we undertake? Reading Intimate Violence, with its focus on the 
most grisly scenes in each of the fictional texts it discusses, is an even more 
wrencrnng experience than reading almost any of those texts individually. 
Jndeed, the cumulative effect of the book is one not of empowerment but of 
despair, as violence comes to seem ever more universal, ever more omnipre-
sent, even while remaining depressingly variable in form, degree, and repre-
sentation. 
Indiana University Helen Sword 
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